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THE ABRAHAM L. POMERANTZ 
LECTURE 
 
Don’t Blink 
SNAP DECISIONS AND SECURITIES REGULATION 
Frank Partnoy† 
Modern securities markets move at record speed. Trading 
decisions are faster than ever. Average investors can immediately 
acquire information. Rapid technologies have benefits, particularly 
reduced costs. But fast-moving markets can also be dangerous. Few 
people had time to think carefully during the financial crisis of 
2008 or the “flash crash” of May 6, 2010, when stocks plunged 5-6 
percent in minutes and then rebounded almost as quickly. 
This article explores the consequences of this speed for 
securities markets. It addresses the extent to which securities 
regulation should take into account the pace of decision making. It 
discusses recent scholarly research on snap decisions and suggests 
legal reforms, some designed to harness the power of quick 
decisions and others directed at their dangers. It proposes that 
regulators slow down the markets with proposals ranging from the 
improbably difficult (steps to respond more deliberately to crises) to 
the improbably simple (adding a lunch break to the trading day). 
  
 † George E. Barrett Professor of Law and Finance, University of San Diego 
School of Law. I am grateful to Michael Cone and Andrew Mundt for research 
assistance, and to Laura Adams, James Fanto, Kent Greenfield, Kristin Johnson, and 
Shaun Martin for helpful comments. I also want to thank Elizabeth Alper and the staff 
of the Brooklyn Law Review for help throughout the process. Finally, I am grateful to 
the Pomerantz family for establishing this lecture series and for including me as one of 
its honored presenters. 
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INTRODUCTION 
This essay addresses snap decisions and securities law, 
so it seems appropriate to begin with a story of one lawyer’s 
snap reaction to Abraham Pomerantz, the renowned and 
respected plaintiffs’ securities litigator who pioneered the use of 
derivative suits by shareholders against corporate officials and 
whose life and career this lecture series honors.1 I have this story 
as double hearsay from Ed Labaton, another well-known 
plaintiffs’ lawyer, who heard it during the 1960s when his firm 
was four floors below the Pomerantz firm and shared its library.2 
It was either a Tuesday or a Thursday, the days on which 
motions were heard back then, outside room 506 of the federal 
courthouse in Manhattan. Abe Pomerantz and a defense lawyer 
from a white-shoe New York law firm had just finished arguing 
a motion. Outside the hearing room, in the lingering heat of the 
argument, the defense lawyer snapped. He made a nasty 
personal attack on Abe, calling him, among other things, a 
“strike-suit lawyer.” Abe didn’t take insults quietly, so he got in 
the other lawyer’s face, pointed his finger, and exclaimed, “I’ll 
see to it that I never sue one of your clients again.” 
If that lawyer had paused for a moment to think about 
why he was able to make a living as a securities defense 
lawyer, he might have held his tongue. In this piece, I argue 
that the same kind of pause that might have helped this lawyer 
also might be good policy in the securities markets. Indeed, I 
intend to show that much of the wisdom of securities regulation 
is directed at limiting or lengthening snap decisions by market 
participants. I also suggest that the study of time and timing 
might be a fruitful area of exploration for securities-law 
scholars and that notions of delay should play a more 
prominent role in the study of markets and corporate and 
securities law, and in policy. 
In some areas of corporate and securities regulation, the 
law introduces delay and probably gets it about right. There is 
a waiting period before registration of securities for an initial 
public offering, and it is illegal to sell securities during that 
  
 1 The Pomerantz Lecture honors the life and work of Abraham L. 
Pomerantz, a 1924 graduate of Brooklyn Law School. The lecture series focuses on 
topics of corporate securities law and related issues of professional responsibility. The 
law firm of Pomerantz Haudek Grossman & Gross LLP, of which Abraham Pomerantz 
was the founding partner, provides continuing support for this series. 
 2 Correspondence with Edward Labaton (Feb. 26, 2011) (on file with author).  
2011] DON’T BLINK 153 
period.3 There is a review and comment process with the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for registration 
statements.4 Private placements are exempt and consequently 
can be created and sold much more quickly.5 (It is worth noting 
that the bulk of troubled assets sold during the financial crisis, 
including collateralized debt obligations (CDOs), fell within the 
private-placement exemption.6) Resales by security holders are 
restricted by Rule 144—no resale for a year.7 Proxy regulation 
delays voting for up to a year.8 Various provisions of the Williams 
Act delay tender offers.9 There are delays related to gun jumping, 
Hart-Scott-Rodino, and other regulatory review processes.10 
Section 16(b) has a six-month disgorgement rule.11 Various 
securities filings are delayed to limited extents, including insider 
ownership forms and Schedules 13D and 13F.12 Short-term 
  
 3 JOHN C. COFFEE, JR. & HILLARY A. SALE, SECURITIES REGULATION: CASES 
AND MATERIALS 165 (Robert C. Clark et al. eds., 11th ed. 2009) (There is an average of 
two to three months of work that must be accomplished before the registration 
statement can be filed.). 
 4 Id. (The period before the Commission finally issues its letter of comments 
can vary greatly. The current SEC policy calls for thirty days but it can take up to one 
hundred days. It often takes longer at the end of the calendar quarter or in March for 
financial statement filings.) 
 5 Id. at 74 (Private placements do not require a registration statement and 
the purchasers are often sophisticated and can be reached quickly and personally.). 
 6  Luis A. Aguilar, Comm’r, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech at SEC Open 
Meeting, Washington, D.C.: Addressing the Information Asymmetry in the Securitization 
Market to Put Investors and the Economy on Safer Footing (Apr. 7, 2010), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2010/spch040710laa.htm (“[M]any have concluded that a 
contributing factor to the crisis was a lack of disclosure about, and understanding of, 
asset-backed securities—including CDOs—offered in private placements.”). 
 7 COFFEE & SALE, supra note 3, at 531; see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.144 (2010) 
(Qualified institutional buyers (QIB) may purchase a restricted security, but that QIB 
still may not resell it to a non-qualified purchaser until after one year has passed.) 
 8 Tom Burnett, The Key Points to Look for in a Corporate Proxy Statement, AM. 
ASS’N OF INDIVIDUAL INVESTORS J., Feb. 2001, at 8, available at http://www.aaii.com/ 
journal/article/the-key-points-to-look-for-in-a-corporate-proxy-statement (“All publicly 
traded companies—with the exception of the tiny ones that are listed on the Nasdaq 
Bulletin Board—must file a proxy statement once a year in advance of their annual 
meeting”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 78n(c) (2006) (prior to the annual meeting, even if no proxy 
solicitation is made, the issuer must still file with the Commission and transmit to all 
holders information equivalent to that found in the proxy).  
 9 COFFEE & SALE, supra note 3, at 726-29. Shareholders can withdraw their 
tendered shares from seven days until sixty days after commencement. Other 
provisions also reduce the pressure to tender. 
 10 E.g., 15 U.S.C. § 77e (It is illegal to sell or offer to buy securities before a 
registration statement has been filed.); id. § 18a (This latter code section requires a 
filing and waiting period before any person that doesn’t meet an exception may acquire 
voting shares.) 
 11 Id. § 78p. 
 12 Id. § 78m (Schedule 13D is ten days and Schedule 13F is forty-five days); 
see also Schedule 13D, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, http://www.sec.gov/ 
answers/sched13.htm (last visited July 30, 2011); Form 13F—Reports Filed by 
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capital gains are taxed at higher rates than long-term gains.13 
Even the most ardent supporters of market efficiency use one-
day, or even multiday, event studies, rather than instantaneous 
analyses of price changes, to assess loss causation and damages 
in securities litigation.14 Deal litigation is fast-paced and frenetic, 
but deal-protection devices create time for directors, lawyers, and 
judges to consider mergers more carefully.15 All these provisions 
illustrate an unspoken, yet overarching, objective of corporate 
and securities law—to slow us down.  
Conversely, consider the dangers when regulators or 
legal rules favor a quick response. Critics of the government’s 
response to the financial crisis, including Sheila Bair, former 
head of the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), 
have noted that panic and quick reactions led to poor decisions, 
particularly in the rescue of Bear Stearns, AIG, and other 
banks (and in the opposite failure to anticipate the complex 
fallout from the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy).16 The public, 
and relatedly legislators, tend to react quickly and negatively 
to short sellers, even though short selling played a valuable 
and important role in uncovering and publicizing financial 
misstatements at various financial institutions, as well as 
Enron.17 Many critics claim corporate officers and directors are 
increasingly focused on short-term share price maximization 
instead of long-term sustainable profits.18 Financial reporting is 
  
Institutional Investment Managers, U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMMISSION, 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/form13f.htm (last visited July 30, 2011).  
 13 IVO WELCH, CORPORATE FINANCE: AN INTRODUCTION 322 (Donna Battista 
ed., 2009).  
 14 Frank Torchio, Proper Event Study Analysis in Securities Litigation, 35 J. 
CORP. L. 159 (2009) (Frank Torchio is president of Forensic Economics, Inc., and 
teaches finance and economics at the William E. Simon Graduate School of Business 
Administration at the University of Rochester. His article is referenced here to 
showcase the prevalence of event studies in today’s market.). For a general synopsis of 
event studies, see ALAN PALMITER & FRANK PARTNOY, CORPORATIONS: A 
CONTEMPORARY APPROACH 91 (2010). 
 15 See PALMITER & PARTNOY, supra note 14, at 959-60. 
 16 See generally Joe Nocera, Sheila Bair’s Bank Shot, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 
2011, (Magazine), at MM24, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/07/10/ 
magazine/sheila-bairs-exit-interview.html?pagewanted=1&_r=1&ref=magazine; Sheila 
C. Bair, Chairman, Fed. Deposit Ins. Corp., Remarks to the National Press Club (June 
24, 2011), available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/chairman/spjun2411.html. 
 17 See FRANK PARTNOY, INFECTIOUS GREED: HOW DECEIT AND RISK 
CORRUPTED THE FINANCIAL MARKETS 406, 408 (2003). 
 18 ASPEN INST. BUS. & SOC’Y PROGRAM, OVERCOMING SHORT-TERMISM: A CALL 
FOR A MORE RESPONSIBLE APPROACH TO INVESTMENT AND BUSINESS MANAGEMENT 2 
(2009), available at http://www.aspeninstitute.org/sites/default/files/content/images/ 
Overcoming%20Short-termism%20AspenCVSG%2015dec09.pdf (Focusing on short-term 
stock performance instead of long-term maximization of profits can increase transaction 
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done on a quarterly basis even though most investors have 
much longer time horizons. Executive compensation is also 
relatively short term. Even annual bonuses create an incentive 
mismatch when the risks associated with employee action are 
borne over longer periods. These issues have become especially 
challenging in recent years, given the crush of technology, the 
press of constant e-mail, the temptations of the Internet, and 
the resulting focus on the short term. 
In this article, I argue that regulation often takes, or 
should take, the approach of encouraging or ordering delay, of 
saying “Don’t Blink.” There are two senses in which I mean 
“Don’t Blink.” One is about keeping our eyes wide open and 
looking closely so we don’t miss something important. The 
other is about the dangers of making snap decisions, as fast as 
the blink of an eye. My goal in exploring these two ideas is to 
encourage scholars to examine the role of delay in financial-
market decision making, and to explore the intersection of 
decision making and time management, so we can better 
understand the benefits associated with waiting and the art 
and science of delay.  
This article will focus on two prominent examples in 
which timing posed particularly important policy challenges: 
the financial crisis of 2008 and the flash crash of May 6, 2010. 
Part I describes the financial crisis, comparing the ways in 
which Goldman Sachs and Citigroup handled the situation and 
analyzing the government’s decision not to save Lehman 
Brothers. Part II discusses the flash crash, documenting the 
concerns with high-frequency trading and proposing 
implementation of circuit breakers and lunch breaks.  
  
costs, encourage dangerous risk-taking, and put stakeholder’s long-term investments in 
jeopardy.) 
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I. THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 
 I begin my discussion of the financial crisis with a story 
about Lehman Brothers and the book Blink, and an 
introduction to the notions of snap decisions and delay in the 
financial markets. Next, I compare the way Goldman Sachs 
dealt with the financial crisis with the approach taken by 
Citigroup, and I analyze the companies’ procedures through the 
lens of the first sense of “Don’t Blink”—staying focused on what 
is important. Finally, I describe the weekend government 
meeting that determined the fate of Lehman Brothers and 
show how this approach comports with the second sense of 
“Don’t Blink”—making a quick decision. 
A. Lehman Brothers and Blink 
Several months after September 2008—the time most 
people think of as the peak of the recent financial crisis—there 
were reports that Lehman Brothers, the investment bank that 
filed for bankruptcy on September 15, 2008, and thereby 
triggered a credit freeze,19 had assigned Blink as part of its 
training program for top executives. Lehman had invited 
Malcolm Gladwell, the author of Blink, to speak to the firm’s 
elite group of future leaders.20 
Blink, a bestselling book from 2005, proposed that we 
should focus on the first two seconds of our decisions.21 Gladwell 
called on readers to “acknowledge there can be as much value 
in the blink of an eye as in months of rational analysis.”22 
Although the later parts of Blink also explored some of the 
dangers associated with biases in decision making,23 the media 
and the public received the book primarily as a justification for 
intuition and snap decisions. 
Before September 15, 2008, my personal views were 
decidedly pro-Blink and anti-Lehman. I greatly admired 
Gladwell, and I had publicly excoriated Lehman. In fact, on 
  
 19  See David Goldman, Credit Freeze: What Lehman Wrought, CNNMONEY 
(Nov. 16, 2008, 7:24 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/11/14/news/economy/two_months_ 
since_lehman/index.htm. 
 20 ANDREW ROSS SORKIN, TOO BIG TO FAIL: THE INSIDE STORY OF HOW WALL 
STREET AND WASHINGTON FOUGHT TO SAVE THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM—AND THEMSELVES 
120 (2009). 
 21 MALCOLM GLADWELL, BLINK: THE POWER OF THINKING WITHOUT THINKING 
8 (2005). 
 22 Id. at 17. 
 23 See, e.g., id. at 252-53. 
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September 14, 2008, just hours before Lehman’s bankruptcy, I 
published an opinion piece in the Financial Times entitled 
“Hubris—is thy name Richard Fuld?”24 My basic take on these 
topics was: Blink good; Lehman bad. 
So my initial reaction when I heard about Lehman’s 
Blink reading assignment—my snap response, in fact—was that 
Lehman officials must have overreacted to the book’s praise for 
quick reactions. The last thing Richard Fuld, the head of 
Lehman, and his fellow managing directors needed was The 
Power of Thinking Without Thinking, which is the subtitle to 
Blink. Indeed, the media portrayed this incident as an example 
of the folly of Lehman’s obsessively short-term focus, and several 
journalists pointed to Joseph Gregory, Lehman’s former 
president, as the architect of the firm’s speedy mindset.25 
As academics, we have two main weapons: a skepticism 
about received wisdom and a lot of time on our hands. So I 
explored the details of this anecdote about Lehman and Blink with 
the hope that I might learn something about Lehman’s culture. 
My interviews and research revealed two interesting things.26 
First, Lehman’s leadership program did not embrace 
snap decision making; instead, it did the opposite, stressing the 
dangers of snap decisions. Joseph Gregory and other senior 
managers at Lehman created a cutting-edge, intellectually 
rigorous training program, taught by leading social science 
scholars. The substance of the program was highly skeptical of 
intuition and snap decisions. Lehman even paid to develop a 
customized Implicit Association Test, or IAT, to demonstrate to 
its own officials how they were biased regarding race, age, 
gender, and politics. The program’s participants and content 
were diverse along just about every axis.  
Malcolm Gladwell’s talk was at the end of the program, 
a capstone designed to get managing directors from around the 
world together to discuss the firm’s global approach to decision 
making. But the folks at Lehman didn’t study a caricature of 
Blink. They read and studied the whole book, including chapter 
  
 24 Frank Partnoy, Hubris—Is Thy Name Richard Fuld?, FT.COM (Sept. 14, 2008, 8:04 
PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/6168c7f6-828e-11dd-a019-000077b07658.html#axzz1RvYple00. 
 25 Gregory was terminated in June 2008, months before the firm’s 
bankruptcy. See Ben White, Lehman Chief Accepts Blame for $2.8bn Loss, FT.COM 
(June 16, 2008, 9:46 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/50a84d4c-3b99-11dd-9cb2-
0000779fd2ac.html#axzz1MpxRSu65. 
 26 During 2011, I interviewed and corresponded with several former Lehman 
employees, who wished to remain anonymous. 
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6 covering the Bronx police shooting Amadou Diallo and the 
concluding chapter on gender bias in music auditions.  
And yet Lehman’s employees made colossally bad 
decisions. They took on too much subprime mortgage risk.27 
They hid liabilities from shareholders.28 They made these bad 
decisions over months and years, and their elite senior 
leadership did not spot or correct them.  
Some scholars have argued that the popular 
interpretation of Blink’s thesis was oversimplified and 
incorrect.29 Seventh Circuit Judge Richard Posner criticized 
Blink’s assumptions and opined that the book was filled with 
attenuated anecdotes, poor analyses, and overreaching 
assumptions.30 More recently, social science researchers published 
empirical work that demonstrates the dangers associated with 
snap decisions.31 This literature shows that two seconds is rarely 
the optimal amount of time in which to make a decision.32  
Even for what we call snap decisions, people frequently 
benefit from waiting at least several seconds, up to a minute or 
so. Some critics argue that analysis trumps intuition for most 
decisions and suggest that even snap decisions are the result of 
longer-term analysis.33 Within particular time frames, ranging 
from a split second to years, people are often better off making 
decisions at the end of the relevant time period—at the very 
last possible instant. Although this kind of delayed action is 
  
 27  See, e.g., Peter Robison & Yalman Onaran, Fuld’s Subprime Bets Fueled 
Profit, Undermined Lehman, BLOOMBERG (Sept. 15, 2008), http://www.bloomberg.com/ 
apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=aiETiKXNbDVE. 
 28 Fraud allegations were raised against Lehman and its accounting firm 
Ernst & Young. See Going for the Auditors: The Ultimate Target of the Lawsuit May Be 
Lehman’s Former Bosses, ECONOMIST (Dec. 29, 2010), http://www.economist.com/node/ 
17800083?story_id=17800083. 
 29 See, e.g., Big Think Interview with Christopher Chabris, BIG THINK, 
http://bigthink.com/ideas/20582 (last visited July 30, 2011) (“We are, in a way, taking 
on the impression that a lot of people have from books like, ‘Blink,’ by Malcolm 
Gladwell, and others in that category, which is sort of an uncritical belief in the power 
of intuition and snap judgments and so on, and the idea that you should rely on them 
whenever possible.”). 
 30 See Richard A. Posner, Blinkered, NEW REPUBLIC (Jan. 24, 2005), 
http://www.law.uchicago.edu/news/posner012405. 
 31 See generally CHRISTOPHER CHABRIS & DANIEL SIMONS, THE INVISIBLE 
GORILLA: AND OTHER WAYS OUR INTUITIONS DECEIVE US (2010); STEVEN JOHNSON, 
WHERE GOOD IDEAS COME FROM: THE NATURAL HISTORY OF INNOVATION (2010). 
 32 See, e.g., Dana R. Carney, C. Randall Colvin & Judith A. Hall, A Thin Slice 
Perspective on the Accuracy of First Impressions, 41 J. RES. PERSONALITY 1054 (2007) 
(studies showing accuracy frequently increasing with response times of greater than 
two seconds). 
 33 See MICHAEL R. LEGAULT, THINK: WHY CRUCIAL DECISIONS CAN’T BE 
MADE IN THE BLINK OF AN EYE 10 (2006).  
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often labeled procrastination, it is really more a form of delay 
management, a process of understanding when to go fast and 
when to go slow.34  
Is it possible to generalize from this new perspective on 
Lehman and Blink to gain any insight into the causes of and 
response to the crisis? One way to assess the importance of 
relying on longer-term analysis versus short-term intuition is 
to compare two institutions that arguably were at opposite 
poles of the financial crisis: Goldman Sachs and Citigroup. 
B. Goldman Sachs, Citigroup, and the Gorilla: The First 
Sense of “Don’t Blink” 
There are many versions of why the financial crisis 
occurred, but they often boil down to the following condition: “If 
you had only taken a step back and thought this through . . . .” 
For example, many financial market participants—bankers, 
investors, and regulators—relied on credit rating agencies and 
mathematical models for analytical shortcuts that were 
woefully inaccurate and inadequate. They used ratings and 
math as mnemonic devices to streamline a massive flow of 
information into something they could understand.35 Then they 
decided that, if this complex structured instrument is rated 
triple-A, or even higher than triple-A, it must be low risk.36  
Consider this sentence: if a Monte Carlo simulation 
based on historical correlation assumptions predicts that the 
probability of subprime mortgage defaults rising to a level that 
would impair a super senior tranche of a synthetic 
collateralized debt obligation is sufficiently small that the 
tranche is virtually risk free, then we can hold tens of billions 
  
 34 Professor Manuel Utset has suggested that the notion of delay 
management can be captured by the mental process of cost-benefit analysis, instead of 
intuition: if the cost of acting immediately outweighs the long-term benefits, the person 
will act. Manuel A. Utset, Procrastination and the Law, in THE THIEF OF TIME: 
PHILOSOPHICAL ESSAYS ON PROCRASTINATION 253, 253-55 (Chrisoula Andreou & Mark 
D. White eds., 2010). 
 35  See, e.g., Why Economists Failed to Predict the Financial Crisis, 
KNOWLEDGE@WHARTON: FIN. & INVESTMENT (May 13, 2009), http://knowledge. 
wharton.upenn.edu/article.cfm?articleid=2234. 
 36 When the realization hit that the CDOs were much riskier than the rating 
they carried, the crediting agencies downgraded them and the banks had to change not 
only their formulas, but also their balance sheets. Between the third quarter of 2007 
and the second quarter of 2008, mortgage securities had been downgraded by $1.9 
trillion. See Jon Birger, The Woman Who Called Wall Street’s Meltdown: Star Bank 
Analyst Meredith Whitney Says the Economy Is About to Sink Into a Deep Recession, 
CNNMONEY (Aug. 6, 2008, 11:57 AM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/08/04/magazines/ 
fortune/whitney_feature.fortune/index.htm. 
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of dollars of that exposure without worry, or indeed without 
even disclosing it. One positive result of the financial crisis is 
that many more people understand the preceding sentence 
than did a few years ago. But not many people took the time to 
understand the principles underlying the text of this sentence 
or to ask for a detailed analysis of why so many triple-A-rated 
synthetic instruments could be created without high-quality 
underlying assets. 
With that background, it is strange that Goldman Sachs 
would emerge as the supposed villain of the financial crisis. By 
every account, Goldman engaged in vigorous, deliberative risk 
management. Groups of senior managers discussed every 
major position. They not only marked positions to market on a 
daily basis, but they analyzed worst-case scenarios.37 They 
publicly disclosed value-at-risk, or VAR, numbers, but 
internally they did not take them on faith.38 They listened to 
and learned from their counterparties, particularly hedge 
funds, who were betting against mortgages.39 When the ABX 
indices of subprime mortgages began declining in 2006, 
Goldman’s analysts undertook a detailed internal study and 
produced a thorough internal report about the risks in its 
mortgage business.40 They studied actual prices, and actual 
profits and losses, instead of trusting ratings and models.41 As a 
result, in December 2006, Goldman determined that it was too 
exposed to subprime mortgages, and it reduced that exposure.42  
Goldman has been vilified for how it reduced its 
exposure to the mortgage market, particularly for selling 
approximately $25 billion of CDOs during the eight months 
  
 37  See Joe Nocera, Risk Management, N.Y. TIMES, (Magazine) (Jan. 2, 2009), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/04/magazine/04risk-t.html?pagewanted=print.  
 38  See Wall Street and the Financial Crisis: The Role of Investment Banks: 
Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on 
Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 111th Cong. 13, 97-98 (2010) [hereinafter 
Hearings] (testimony of David L. Sparks and testimony of Craig W. Broderick). 
 39 Complaint at 5-6, SEC v. Goldman Sachs & Co., No. 10-03229 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 
16, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/litigation/complaints/2010/comp-pr2010-59.pdf. 
 40 Hearings, supra note 38, at 95-96 (testimony of David Viniar); see also 
Nocera, supra note 37.  
 41 See Hearings, supra note 38, at 95-96 (testimony of David Viniar); see also 
Nocera, supra note 37. 
 42 See Hearings, supra note 38, at 4 (statement of Sen. Carl Levin, Chairman, S. 
Comm. on Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs); see also Stephen Foley, Goldman 
Trims Sub-Prime Risk, INDEPENDENT (Mar. 14, 2007), http://www.independent.co.uk/ 
news/business/news/goldman-trims-subprime-risk-440134.html. 
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after it decided to reduce its positions.43 Goldman paid $550 
million to settle SEC allegations that the firm failed to disclose 
information about CDO deals it sold to clients.44 But whatever 
you might think of Goldman’s behavior, these actions didn’t 
cause the financial crisis. Indeed, Goldman was one of a 
handful of financial institutions that survived the crisis intact 
because it reduced its mortgage exposure in late 2006. 
Goldman spotted the eight-hundred-pound gorilla in the 
financial markets in late 2006—the huge risk that a housing 
price decline would lead to highly correlated system-wide 
defaults, which would erode the value of subprime mortgages 
and particularly super-senior tranches of synthetic CDOs. 
Goldman Sachs avoided the kind of inattentional blindness 
that plagued other banks with exposure to these instruments. 
Goldman stepped back and questioned its own judgment. Now 
consider Citigroup as a counterexample to Goldman.  
Citigroup made some of the most egregious mistakes of 
any financial institution during the crisis. Its board and 
executives made snap judgments based on intuition and 
mnemonics and did not undertake more thoughtful analysis. It 
lost billions of dollars on super-senior positions.45 Citigroup’s 
snap judgments and a failure to step back and think should 
have destroyed the firm.  
Although the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission 
report was a trifurcated political mess,46 some of its hearings 
provided useful color, particularly about Citigroup. Citigroup’s 
directors and officers accepted naïve risk management 
perspectives. For example, Robert Rubin, the former Treasury 
Secretary, who was paid more than a hundred million dollars 
in cash and stock during his eight years at Citigroup, testified 
that “I don’t think anybody focused on the CDOs. This was one 
business in a vast enterprise, and until the trouble developed, 
it wasn’t one that had any particular profile.”47 Rubin said he 
relied on Thomas Maheras. He said, “You know, Tom Maheras 
was in charge of trading. Tom was an extremely well regarded 
  
 43 FIN. CRISIS INQUIRY COMM’N, THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY REPORT: 
FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON THE CAUSES OF THE FINANCIAL AND 
ECONOMIC CRISIS IN THE UNITED STATES 236 (2011) [hereinafter FCIC REPORT].  
 44 Id. at 193. 
 45 See Frank Partnoy, Citigroup Bail-out Is Smart but Not Risk-Free, FT.COM 
(Nov. 27, 2008, 7:07 PM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/2975ca48-bc99-11dd-9efc-0000779 
fd18c.html#axzz1bisJhX7h. 
 46 See Frank Partnoy, Washington’s Financial Disaster, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 
2011, at WK9. 
 47 FCIC REPORT, supra note 43, at 262. 
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trading figure on the street. . . . And this is what traders do, 
they handle these kinds of problems.”48 
What about Tom Maheras? Maheras, the co-CEO of 
Citigroup’s investment bank, made more than $34 million in 
2006 but admitted he spent “less than 1% of his time thinking 
about CDOs.”49 Yet another of Citigroup’s managing directors, 
Susan Mills, had warned about the deteriorations in Citigroup’s 
subprime loan quality in early 2006.50 This was the gorilla: 
default rates that were doubling or even tripling, that threatened 
Citigroup’s tens of billions of dollars of super senior CDO 
positions. Yet the senior managers didn’t see this weakness. 
They didn’t have the perspective Goldman did because they 
didn’t step back. Instead, they sold more CDOs and retained even 
more subprime risk. The Federal Reserve found that Citigroup’s 
senior management “did not appropriately consider the potential 
balance sheet implications of this strategy.”51  
Why didn’t Citigroup see the gorilla? When we are 
distracted, we don’t see gorillas. I am using the term “gorilla” 
deliberately, to reference the visual awareness experiments at 
Harvard conducted by Christopher Chabris and Daniel Simons. 
Chabris and Simons showed their subjects a short film 
depicting two teams of people, one dressed in white and one in 
black, moving around and passing basketballs.52 They asked 
their subjects to silently count the number of passes made by 
players wearing white shirts.53 Halfway through the video, a 
student wearing a full-body gorilla suit walks in, stops in the 
middle of the players, thumps her chest, and walks off.54 She 
spends nine seconds on screen, about one-sixth of the entire 
video.55 Yet when Chabris and Simons queried their subjects 
after they watched the video, one-half of people did not notice 
the gorilla.56 They had “inattentional blindness.”57 They devoted 
their attention to one part of the world, and did not recognize 
  
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. at 198. 
 50 Id. at 260. 
 51 Id. at 199. 
 52 CHABRIS & SIMONS, supra note 31, at 5. 
 53  Id. 
 54  Id. at 6. 
 55  Id. at 5-6. 
 56  Id. at 6. 
 57  Id.  
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the striking events in the other part. Numerous studies have 
replicated this result.58 
Goldman saw the gorilla; Citigroup did not. Numerous 
hedge funds saw the gorilla; regulators did not. The financial 
crisis boils down to a simple problem: not enough people saw 
the gorilla. This is the first sense of “Don’t Blink”—don’t let 
your attention lapse, stay focused on the important matters. 
What, if anything, can securities regulation do about this 
problem? There are two things, and they are not new. Indeed, 
they are the twin pillars of the 1930s securities laws: mandatory 
disclosure and ex post anti-fraud enforcement.59 As Enron 
illustrated, adequate disclosure does not mean burying opaque 
references in footnotes. Enron’s infamous footnote 16, which 
purported to disclose some of the firm’s off-balance sheet risks, 
set off a few reporters and short sellers, but it didn’t adequately 
inform investors of the firm’s risks in a salient way.60 Likewise, 
Citigroup’s disclosure of subprime risk was impenetrable, buried 
in a web of complex off-balance sheet entities.61 
If you want to ensure that people spot the gorilla, you 
have to tell them there might be a gorilla. Citigroup could have 
made its risks salient to investors and senior managers. If 
Citigroup had disclosed worst-case scenarios in its financial 
statements—that it would lose tens of billions of dollars if 
housing prices declined significantly—surely Bob Rubin and 
Tom Maheras would have paid more attention.62  
According to Chuck Prince, Citigroup’s CEO, his and the 
firm’s decisions should not be criticized in hindsight. He said,  
  
 58  See id. at 39-40 (citing, among other examples, people who miss safety 
infractions right in front of them, high school teachers and administrators who fail to 
notice bullying, and fair-minded employers who do not notice discriminatory practices). 
 59  Frank Partnoy & Lynn E. Turner, Bring Transparency to Off-Balance 
Sheet Accounting, in MAKE MARKETS BE MARKETS: THE REPORT (2010), available at 
http://makemarketsbemarkets.org/report/MakeMarketsBeMarkets.pdf 
 60  See STAFF OF S. COMM. ON GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS, 107TH CONG., 
FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT OF ENRON: THE SEC AND PRIVATE-SECTOR WATCHDOGS 35-36 
(Comm. Print 2002). 
 61 See RooseveltNYC, Frank Partnoy on Off-Balance Sheet Transactions 
(MMBM—Roosevelt Institute), YOUTUBE (Mar. 6, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/ 
watch?v=xpqYL_xEoVo (last visited July 30, 2011). 
 62 Some have questioned whether the gorilla wasn’t missed, but rather ignored, 
largely due to the profitability of the risky investments before the crash. It remains 
unclear how many bank executives were consciously aware of their institutions’ risk 
exposure but were hubristic about the risk, or whether senior personnel really failed to 
understand the key mathematical algorithms. See Donald C. Langevoort, Chasing the 
Greased Pig Down Wall Street: A Gatekeeper’s Guide to the Psychology, Culture and 
Ethics of Financial Risk-Taking, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1209, 1221-22 (2011). 
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If someone had elevated to my level that we were putting on a $2 
trillion balance sheet, $40 billion of triple-A, zero-risk paper, that 
would not in any way have excited my attention. It wouldn’t have 
been useful for someone to come to me and say, “Now, we have got $2 
trillion on the balance sheet of assets. I want to point out to you 
there is a one in a billion chance that this $40 billion could go south.” 
That would not have been useful information.63  
This statement is hard to reconcile with Prince’s 2006 
comment: “When the music stops, in terms of liquidity, things 
will be complicated. But as long as the music is playing, you’ve 
got to get up and dance. We’re still dancing.”64  
What the FCIC investigators should have asked Prince 
was this: “What if someone had elevated to your level the risk 
that the bank would become insolvent if housing prices 
declined 30 percent? Would that have excited your attention? 
Would that have been useful information?” Worst-case 
scenarios are the gorillas of the financial markets, and they 
should be disclosed in far greater detail. Prince’s reference to 
“complicated” in his “music” quote suggests that he was aware, 
at least in part, of these risks. In any event, even if the 
awareness was buried at a lower level within the bank, there 
should have been a mechanism that led to its disclosure. 
Unfortunately, the Dodd-Frank Act and other reforms 
do not require disclosure of these kinds of facts, either to the 
public or to regulators. Some companies try to do this privately 
through risk management,65 emulating Goldman Sachs. But 
securities regulation reform could help encourage managers 
and shareholders to engage in more long-term analysis than 
short-term intuition by requiring more robust and salient 
disclosure of worst-case scenarios. 
The second pillar—antifraud—is also relevant. If the 
directors and officers of Citigroup are not held responsible for 
failures to disclose gorillas, why would they disclose gorillas? 
Yet private rights of action by shareholders have been 
substantially restricted in recent years,66 and government 
prosecutions have not filled the gap. The early shareholder 
  
 63 FCIC REPORT, supra note 43, at 260. 
 64 Langevoort, supra note 62, at 1224 (quoting Michiyo Nakamoto & David 
Wighton, Bullish Citigroup Is ‘Still Dancing’ to the Beat of the Buy-Out Boom, FIN. 
TIMES (London), July 10, 2007, at 1-1). 
 65 Fat-Tail Attraction: Investors’ Interest in Hedging Tail Risk Is Growing, 
ECONOMIST, Mar. 11, 2011, at 84.  
 66  See, e.g., Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-
4 (2006). 
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derivative litigation against Citigroup was dismissed;67 it 
remains to be seen whether federal class actions against 
Citigroup, and other financial institutions, will fare better.68 As 
of late 2011, there had been no major criminal cases against 
individual Wall Street employees. 
Last year, the SEC civilly charged Citigroup with 
repeatedly making misleading statements about its exposure to 
subprime-mortgage-related assets. According to the SEC, 
“Between July and mid-October 2007, Citigroup represented 
that subprime exposure in its investment banking unit was $13 
billion or less, when in fact it was more than $50 billion.”69 For 
that epic fraud, Citigroup paid a $75 million penalty.70 Its 
former chief financial officer Gary Crittenden agreed to pay 
$100,000, and former head of investor relations Arthur 
Tildesley, Jr., agreed to pay $80,000.71 These numbers are 
obviously inadequate to deter financial fraud. If Citigroup and 
its executives had known these would be the penalties in 
advance, they would not have had any economic incentive to 
behave differently. A short-term-focused illegal decision is 
more profitable than a long-term-focused legal one. 
Another useful policy tool would encourage market 
participants to rely, as Goldman did, on market measures of 
risk instead of ratings and financial models. The Dodd-Frank 
Act requires the elimination of regulatory references to ratings, 
and that important project is in progress.72 The SEC has 
proposed rules for Forms S-3 and F-3 filings and related 
documents, based on the presence of a deep market for such 
seasoned issues,73 but there is some reluctance to substitute 
  
 67 In re Citigroup Inc. S’holder Derivative Litig., 964 A.2d 106, 140 (Del. Ch. 2009). 
 68 See, e.g., Securities Class Action Filings, STAN. L. SCH. SEC. CLASS ACTION 
CLEARINGHOUSE, http://securities.stanford.edu/fmi/xsl/SCACPUDB/recordlist.xsl?-db= 
SCACPUDB&-lay=Search&case_type_SCAC_PRELIMINARYids=CREDIT&-sortfield.1= 
FIC_DateFiled&-sortfield.2=LitigationName&-sortorder.1=ascend&-max=100&-find (last 
visited Sept. 16, 2011) (compiling securities class action filings arising out of the financial 
crisis). 
 69 Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n., SEC Charges Citigroup and 
Two Executives for Misleading Investors About Exposure to Subprime Mortgage Assets 
(July 29, 2010), available at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2010/2010-136.htm. 
 70  See Eric Dash & Louise Story, Citigroup Pays $75 Million to Settle 
Subprime Claims, N.Y. TIMES, July 30, 2010, at B1. 
 71  Id. 
 72  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-203, § 939, 124 Stat. 1376 (2010). 
 73 Security Ratings, 76 Fed. Reg. 46,603 (Aug. 3, 2011) (to be codified at 17 
C.F.R. pts. 200, 229, 230, 232, 239, 240, 249). 
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market-based measures of credit risk for ratings in regulation.74 
International regulators continue to rely on ratings.75 The 
future of ratings in regulation remains unclear. 
A market-based approach would improve risk-related 
incentives at financial institutions. Consider how much more 
difficult it would have been for Citigroup’s CDO desk to take on 
large amounts of subprime risk in 2006 if—instead of reporting 
internally that the risk was triple-A, or better than triple-A, or 
that the probability of loss was one in a trillion according to the 
model—it had reported the market price of the risk and noted 
that the price had increased from ten to thirty basis points. 
Based on its valuation model in late August 2006, Citigroup 
reported that losses on its super senior tranches might range 
from $15 million to $2 billion.76 Yet market prices, as reflected in 
credit default swaps, had already plummeted by that time. 
Markets are not always correct, of course, but market measures 
of risk can provide an early warning detector, a gut check, to help 
people avoid using their gut reactions in the wrong way. That is 
one reason why Goldman decided to reduce its exposure in 
December 2006, nearly two years before Lehman’s bankruptcy. 
Investment decisions based on ratings might not seem 
like high-speed snap decisions. But they are decisions that are 
made quickly in a relative sense. If people are accustomed to 
equating triple-A ratings with safety, then when they see 
triple-A, they will anchor around the idea that the triple-A-
rated instrument is safe. Most of the decision about safety and 
risk is made immediately, at a pre-conscious level. Hopefully, 
the snap reaction that people have today to the triple-A symbol 
is dramatically more skeptical than the snap reaction people 
had a few years ago. 
C. Lehman’s Bankruptcy and a Weekend at the Federal 
Reserve: The Second Sense of “Don’t Blink” 
A different financial crisis decision was “Don’t Blink”-
like in the second sense I’m discussing, in that the decision was 
made too quickly. This is the decision, not by Lehman’s traders 
about the bank, but about Lehman by its regulators. On 
  
 74 See Yali N’Diaye, US SEC to Address Reliance on Credit Ratings Yet 
Again, MARKET NEWS INT’L (Apr. 25, 2011, 2:49 PM) (on file with author). 
 75  See, e.g., WALTER W. EUBANKS, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41467, THE 
STATUS OF THE BASEL III CAPITAL ADEQUACY ACCORD 11 (2010). 
 76 FCIC REPORT, supra note 43, at 264. 
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September 10, 2008, the “[Federal Reserve Bank of New York] 
staff put together a draft gameplan for a ‘liquidity consortium’ 
of major Wall Street banks to provide a forum where these 
firms can explore possibilities of joint funding mechanisms to 
avert Lehman’s insolvency.”77 But the gameplan provided that 
“[c]onsortium members would be given ‘[v]ery little advance’ 
notice, ‘2 hours max,’ in order to ‘minimize the risk of outside 
leaks.’”78 Then, the consortium banks would have only the 
weekend—no longer—to perform due diligence on Lehman. If 
no plan emerged, the Federal Reserve officials would “reach out 
to regulators in DC and abroad to inform them of potential 
market disruptions at the opening of business on Monday.”79 
On Friday night, September 12, 2008, twelve 
investment bank CEOs were summoned to the Federal 
Reserve’s headquarters at 33 Liberty Street in New York.80 
Over the weekend, they agreed to provide $20 billion to support 
a purchase of Lehman by Barclays Capital.81 But it was a deal 
that was doomed to fail—or at least doomed to fail by Monday. 
Barclays executives were not invited to the consortium 
meeting; they were separately conducting due diligence that 
night and over the weekend to decide whether to acquire 
Lehman.82 Barclays made it clear that in order to guarantee 
Lehman’s financial obligations, a requirement of any deal, it 
would need shareholder approval, something that could not 
happen before Monday.83 When British regulators confirmed 
that this requirement would hold, the deal fell through, and 
Lehman filed for bankruptcy on Monday.84 
We can never know what might have happened if the 
government had waited a bit longer. Yes, the credit markets were 
tight during mid-September 2008. But interest rates were still 
relatively low. LIBOR was below five percent.85 Would some 
parties have been willing to provide short-term loans at higher 
  
 77 Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner at 1517, In re Lehman Bros. 
Holdings, Inc., 433 B.R. 113 (2010) (quoting FRBNY, Liquidity Consortium (Sept. 10, 
2008), at 1 [FRBNY to Exam. 003517]). 
 78 Id. 
 79 Id. at 1520 (quoting FRBNY, Timeline—Liquidation Consortium (Sept. 11, 
2008), at 2 [FRBNY to Exam. 003514]). 
 80  Id. at 1524. 
 81  Id. at 1528. 
 82  Id. at 1524-25. 
 83  Id. at 1527-28. 
 84  Id. at 1527, 1535. 
 85  LIBOR Rates History: Historical LIBOR Rate Information, FEDPRIMERATE.COM, 
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rates, or would the markets really have frozen? It is very possible. 
But regulators could step back and think about these possibilities. 
That weekend, they were trapped by a snap decision. 
Although commentators disagree about a wide range of 
issues related to the collapse of Lehman, it is undeniable that 
the decisions about whether to rescue Lehman were made 
quickly, perhaps more quickly than any financial regulatory 
decisions in history. The overwhelming pressures from 
technology—e-mail, the web, computing power, smart phones—
sped up the pace of responses. Regulators struggled to avoid 
the crush of this time pressure.  
It is ironic that government officials, who so often are 
thought to act too slowly, should have acted so quickly under 
time pressure during the financial crisis. The problem is that 
regulators have not considered a challenge for all types of 
leaders in the modern technological age: how to manage delay. 
Some time-pressured scenarios are unavoidable, but the clear 
message of recent research is that they should be avoided 
whenever possible and that, to the extent they cannot be 
avoided, there should be emergency plans in place so that the 
senior regulators are experts, not novices, in crisis situations. 
Regulators, like market participants, should consciously 
address the art and science of delay. 
II. THE FLASH CRASH 
The second “Don’t Blink” topic is the so-called “flash 
crash.” First, I describe the events of May 6, 2010, and discuss 
the role played by high-frequency trading. Then, I explain that 
regulation should frame these issues as part of the second 
sense of “Don’t Blink.” Finally, I propose two strategies to 
encourage delay: implementation of circuit breakers and the 
introduction of a lunch break. 
A. A Thirty-Six Minute Roller Coaster 
At 2:32 p.m. on May 6, 2010, an employee of Waddell & 
Reed, a mutual fund company headquartered about a mile from 
my childhood home in Overland Park, Kansas, clicked start on 
a computerized trading software program.86 The firm’s goal was 
  
 86 The details about the “flash crash” were reported in U.S. COMMODITY 
FUTURES TRADING COMM’N & U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FINDINGS REGARDING THE 
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to reduce its exposure to $4.1 billion of stocks it owned by 
selling something called “E-Mini” futures contracts.87 The “E-
Mini” is based on the Standard & Poor’s 500 Index of top 
stocks, except that it is traded in small amounts (hence, 
“Mini”), and it goes through an electronic trading platform 
instead of the frenzied “open outcry” method still used for other 
futures contracts (hence, “E”). To hedge $4.1 billion of stocks, 
Waddell & Reed would need to sell 75,000 E-Mini contracts.88 
Instead of having its own employees manually enter 
these orders or calling a broker, Waddell & Reed used this 
automated computer program.89 Each minute, the program 
calculated the number of E-Mini contracts traded during the 
previous minute.90 It then automatically sold nine percent of 
that number.91 The program was designed to take several 
hours, or perhaps even days, to sell 75,000 E-Mini contracts.92 
Instead, the program triggered the fastest roller coaster 
ride in the history of financial markets. At first, when Waddell 
& Reed’s computers started to sell, high-frequency traders, 
with their own computer programs, stepped in to buy. The 
market was calm and balanced—for about nine minutes.93  
But after nine minutes, at 2:41 p.m., high-frequency 
traders began selling the contracts they had accumulated in 
order to zero-out their positions.94 High-frequency traders do 
not typically maintain significant long or short positions for 
more than a few minutes.95 During the first minute of their 
switching sides, trading volume increased, and Waddell & 
Reed’s automated program responded by selling a larger 
number of E-Mini contracts.96 Then, in the second minute, more 
traders sold, and so did the automated program.97 During the 
third and fourth minutes, everyone sold even more, in a kind of 
high-speed computerized trading death spiral.98  
  
JOINT ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON EMERGING REGULATORY ISSUES (2010) [hereinafter 
CFTC/SEC FINDINGS]. 
 87  Id. at 2. 
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By 2:45 p.m., trading volume was exploding, and the E-
Mini futures contract was collapsing.99 Its price had fallen 5 
percent in just thirteen minutes.100 The high-frequency 
computer programs were a large share of the market at this 
time.101 During one fourteen-second period, high-frequency 
traders accounted for 27,000 E-Mini contracts, about half of the 
total trading volume.102 
The decline in the E-Mini contracts instantly spread to 
the rest of the market. Some of the contagion was bizarre, even 
inexplicable. Some was due to “stub orders” set at absurdly low 
prices. Some was due to computer algorithms that hadn’t 
anticipated this kind of shock. Many high-frequency traders 
exited their positions entirely, running for the virtual hills. 
Stock indices other than the E-Mini also collapsed, as did 
individual stocks. At 2:47 p.m., shares of Accenture plc, the 
consulting firm, fell from nearly $40 to $30, and then 
suddenly—in just seven seconds—plummeted to one cent.103 A 
few minutes later, shares of Procter & Gamble, the consumer 
products company, fell from more than $60 to $40.104 Shares of 
blue-chip companies such as IBM, Apple, 3M, and General 
Electric also declined abruptly.105 
But then, just as fast, the market snapped to life. 
Accenture traded near $40 again; Procter & Gamble was back 
above $60.106 Within minutes, the E-Mini contract and all these 
stocks recovered. By 3:08 p.m., the market settled, and prices 
were about the same as they were before Waddell & Reed 
started the computer program.107 The program had finished 
selling 75,000 E-Mini contracts, and then, by instruction, it 
shut down. The entire ride, the bust and boom now known as 
the “flash crash,” had taken just thirty-six minutes. 
B. High-Frequency Trading 
Many critics have blamed high-frequency traders for the 
flash crash. They say high-frequency trading is socially 
wasteful and dangerous. Yet there is overwhelming empirical 
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evidence showing that under “normal” conditions high-
frequency traders constitute a powerful positive force in the 
markets. So-called low-latency trading improves traditional 
yardsticks for market quality, such as liquidity and short-term 
volatility.108 Recent empirical work shows that high-frequency 
traders did not trigger the flash crash.109 The trigger was the 
computer program at Waddell & Reed. 
However, the evidence also shows that during periods of 
high market uncertainty—such as May 6, 2010—high-
frequency trading is associated with increased volatility.110 
High-frequency trading appears to be most dangerous when 
new information is entering the market, when it can cause 
prices to swing more dramatically.111 
High-frequency trading is a dominant force in modern 
markets. Estimates suggest that it accounts for almost three-
quarters of dollar trading volume in the United States.112 As the 
SEC has recognized, proprietary high-frequency traders have 
largely replaced specialists and market makers in stock 
trading.113 High-frequency traders’ strategies vary widely, and 
some are more defensible than others.114 
High-frequency trading isn’t going away. So what 
should be done about it? First, it is worth noting that just as 
computers have beaten human beings at chess and on 
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Jeopardy, it is unlikely that human regulators would have 
much of a chance against high-speed computer trading 
software. These algorithms move and change too quickly for 
regulators to act or react in any meaningful way. By the time 
the SEC/CFTC report on the flash crash was published on 
September 30, 2010, market participants already had switched 
to new strategies. No one would use Waddell & Reed’s trading 
program today. The algorithms that worked last month 
probably no longer work.  
Nevertheless, regulators can try to play the same role 
they have played in markets generally, even when they are 
outmatched. No one believes that prosecutors can stamp out all 
insider trading, but most people still favor some regulatory 
efforts to deter insider trading.  
Likewise, the government can bring cases against high-
frequency traders who violate the law. It is unclear how much 
high-frequency trading is illegal.115 It probably isn’t a large 
percentage, but it isn’t zero, either. But for these kinds of 
illegal, fraudulent, and manipulative activities, there is not a 
need for new statutes or regulations. Front running and insider 
trading are already illegal under current law.116 If regulators 
are unable to bring cases against illegal high-frequency 
trading, a new regulatory regime might defer to private rights 
of action. If investors are disadvantaged by high-frequency 
traders, one way to police the practice would be through a 
private attorney-general role. To the extent high-frequency 
traders are engaged in manipulative market practices, 
regulators should either prosecute that activity or encourage 
private actions that deter it. 
  
 115 For example, there is an ongoing debate about the extent to which high-
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C. Lunch Breaks and Circuit Breakers: The Second Sense 
of “Don’t Blink” 
The other—and perhaps even more important—policy 
for regulators to implement is a “Don’t Blink” strategy. They 
should encourage delay. Indeed, regulators should heed one of 
the lessons that market participants in the high-frequency 
trading area are learning: a crucial element of successful 
trading is delay management. For some strategies, it is best to 
be first. But for other strategies, it is better to wait a little bit. 
There are various catch phrases that describe this, like “the 
first-mover disadvantage” or, conversely, “the second-mover 
advantage.” Or “the second mouse gets the cheese.” A complete 
analysis of this phenomenon is beyond the scope of this article, 
so I will simply note that UNX, a high-frequency trading firm, 
was ranked as the top execution-only broker in numerous 
trading categories from 2005 through mid-2007, and one major 
reason for its success was that its trading executive was 
slightly delayed, by a few dozen milliseconds.117 
Regulators follow the lead of this private market 
philosophy and slow down the markets by introducing explicit 
pauses. One of this article’s themes is that decision makers 
should take time to step back and think. Yet given the speed of 
modern markets, there is little time for market participants to 
do that. Regulators could create more time with circuit breakers.  
Regulators have introduced circuit breakers already to 
force markets to shut down when they have declined by certain 
specified amounts. After the flash crash, the SEC adopted a pilot 
program to introduce a five-minute pause if the price of any 
stock in the S&P 500 Index fell by 10 percent or more during a 
five-minute period. After the five-minute pause, the primary 
listing market would use an auction process to determine the 
new opening price.118 In September 2010, the pilot program was 
expanded to the Russell 1000 Index and some exchange traded 
funds. Trading would halt for five minutes.119 These pauses are a 
  
 117 Isabelle Clary, Familiar Names Lead Best-Execution List, PENSIONS & 
INVESTMENTS, June 11, 2007, at 2, available at https://www.fidelitycapitalmarkets.com/ 
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sensible supplement to the circuit breakers that apply generally 
during major market downturns. 
But it is also worth asking more generally if markets 
would benefit from the introduction of longer pauses, of breaks 
during the day designed to encourage thinking and deliberation 
before action. When I worked in Morgan Stanley’s Tokyo office 
during the 1990s, I was struck by the impact of the ninety-
minute lunch break on trading. Not that Morgan Stanley’s 
traders were models of propriety during lunch: some of the 
most egregious trades described in my book F.I.A.S.C.O. were 
created in Tokyo, and were conceived during those breaks.120 
Still, as a general matter, Tokyo’s pause in market 
trading led to more rational thinking about the trading day and 
often helped cooler heads prevail. During the morning’s two-
hour trading session, traders and salespeople focused on prices 
and deals. There was relentless pressure to execute. But then 
there was a break from 11:00 a.m. until 12:30 p.m. During that 
time, traders, salespeople, and clients had conversations that 
actually lasted for more than a few seconds. They pondered 
new investment strategies or ideas. They read. Sometimes 
during the lunch break they even had lunch. Following this 
break, there was another two-and-a-half hour trading session 
during the afternoon. The stock exchanges in Hong Kong, 
Shenzhen, and Singapore followed a similar approach, with 
ninety-minute, mid-day breaks. In contrast, all the world’s 
other stock exchanges, including those in the United States, 
have been and are still open continuously from the morning 
until the closing bell. 
Unfortunately, the Asian markets are now moving 
toward the Western model. In February 2011, the Tokyo Stock 
Exchange announced that it would shorten its lunch break by 
thirty minutes beginning in May, shifting the start of lunch 
back to 11:30 a.m. from 11:00 a.m.121 Some commentators 
criticized the move. One market participant suggested that 
extending the time for trading probably would not boost volume 
because “trading tends to focus around the beginning and end 
  
audit trail to detect disturbances in the market. See id. at 7, 10; see also Michael Mackenzie & 
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http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/d18f3d28-7735-11e0-aed6-00144feabdc0.html#axzz1OorJDaYi.  
 120 See generally FRANK PARTNOY, F.I.A.S.C.O.: BLOOD IN THE WATER ON 
WALL STREET (1997). 
 121 Takako Iwatani & Kana Nishizawa, Tokyo Bourse Will Start Shorter Lunch 
Break on May 9, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 6, 2011, 11:08 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-
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of trading sessions.”122 Interestingly, 70 percent of corporate and 
individual investors opposed the plan to extend trading hours.123 
Yet it passed. 
A typical law review article about financial market 
regulation might propose an intricate and complex reform of 
computer algorithm-driven trading. Instead, let me offer a 
more basic reform idea: force traders to break for lunch. I favor 
the introduction of a lunch break at the New York Stock 
Exchange and NASDAQ.  
A lunch break would create a much-needed pause for 
reflection and thought during the trading day. Breaks have the 
additional benefit of creating another opening time, after 
lunch, when prices would be set based on a pool of bids and 
offers. At the extreme, the modern trading day might consist 
simply of two or three brief auctions, with breaks between 
them. Critics will argue that there would be less liquidity 
under such a regime, and there very well might. Only an 
experiment could answer questions about this concern. But the 
benefits of giving market participants more time to engage in 
thoughtful discourse and analysis could substantially outweigh 
any potential loss of liquidity.  
Moreover, it is worth asking how much liquidity is 
necessary in today’s securities markets. How often do even the 
most active traders need to move in and out of positions at 
particular moments during the day? Most high-frequency traders 
maintain a flat trading profile, and they zero-out positions right 
away, or at the latest by the end of the day. Few fundamental 
traders need to move the bulk of their positions at particular 
times. And introducing pauses could also deter retail investors 
from day trading, which is an addictive (and on balance a 
destructive and losing) strategy. Intraday pauses could create 
time for people to engage in more productive uses of their time.  
Imagine this thought experiment. What if you could 
trade in U.S. equities or any financial instrument whose value 
is derived from U.S. equities for only one hour in the morning 
and one hour in the afternoon? Trades at any other time would 
be unenforceable. Any purchases and sales during paused 
periods would be void. Or, in a less extreme version, trades 
during paused periods could be subject to a transaction tax. Of 
course, there would be pressure for trades to occur outside of 
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this legal framework for so-called regulatory arbitrage. The 
policy would require international coordination, but that is 
getting easier as the major exchanges merge. What if each of 
the major global markets agreed to trade for an hour or two 
only, and refused to enforce trades outside those time periods?  
Many market participants would complain about a 
reduction in liquidity. And perhaps they would be right. But 
liquidity at what cost? And why would one conclude that there 
would be greater liquidity during a twenty-four hour, constant 
international trading day, which is where current trading 
trends are headed? There is a strong argument and evidence 
that constant trading merely gives the illusion of liquidity. 
For example, one lesson from the flash crash is that the 
supposed liquidity provided by high-frequency traders and 
others can evaporate very quickly. When there is an error—the 
next Waddell & Reed program, or the next extra-zero input by a 
“fat finger”—it will occur at a random time, when liquidity will 
be limited. Wouldn’t it be better for such errors to occur during a 
compressed timeframe, when everyone is trading? On a per-
trading-moment basis, there arguably should be greater market 
depth and liquidity after the timing of trading is restricted. 
Indeed, limiting trading hours might be an especially good idea 
for less liquid stocks, which would have deeper markets, albeit 
for a shorter time. The major disadvantage would be that some 
people who want to trade a few hours earlier will not be able to 
do so. But who fits within that category? 
Interestingly, the SEC/CFTC investigation of the flash 
crash indirectly supports this pause idea: “Another key lesson 
from May 6 is that many market participants employ their own 
versions of a trading pause—either generally or in particular 
products—based on different combinations of market signals.”124 
The study confirmed that “a liquidity crisis can develop if many 
market participants withdraw at the same time.”125 Much good 
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policy comes from market-based insights. If markets are 
pausing, shouldn’t regulators? 
One final point: although circuit breakers are designed 
to kick in only when markets are collapsing, why should they 
have effect only in times of downward stress? The dot.com and 
housing bubbles are just the latest examples of the dangers 
associated with rapid moves up as well as down. Perhaps if 
market participants paused when markets surged they might 
question more why markets were surging. 
CONCLUSION 
Delay plays an important, though often hidden, role in 
financial markets and financial market regulation. Delay 
management can be an important policy tool for regulators. 
But rather than conclude by repeating my thoughts about 
delay and securities regulation, I want to make the point in a 
more oblique way, by explaining briefly how the idea of “Don’t 
Blink” applies to the writing of this article. 
Professor James Fanto first contacted me about the 
Pomerantz lecture during mid-September 2010, and we agreed 
on a lecture date of March 15, 2011. That gave me six months 
to prepare for the talk. We discussed possible topics, and I 
promptly did nothing about the lecture for nearly two months.  
The topics went into my deep subconscious, where they 
brewed until early November 2010, when I received an e-mail 
from Elizabeth Alper of Brooklyn Law School requesting that, 
by November 15, I confirm the title and write a brief 
description of the topic for publicity materials. The topic 
bubbled in my brain for a while. I did some research, and 
generally spent more time reading about the financial crisis 
and the flash crash. I wrote a paragraph about the talk, and 
finally signed off on the description on December 3, 2010, more 
than two weeks late. (I don’t want to mention how long I took 
to complete speaker permission and expense forms; that is just 
too embarrassing.) 
I was still nowhere near starting to draft this article, 
though I was reading and researching the two topics more, and I 
was getting a better idea of what I would cover. I hired two 
research assistants to help me gather background materials for 
each topic.  
Then, after the winter break, on February 9, 2011, Jim 
Fanto sent me the following gentle e-mail reminder: “What do 
you think? The talk is on Mar. 15. Kristin and Kent are 
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expected to give about 5–10 minutes each of comments. Can 
you give them something two weeks before? One week before?” 
I responded that I would send them something by March 1, 
stating that “I’m working on it and will get all of you something 
as soon as I can.” I read and researched more, and I thought 
more. I began to outline some of my thoughts. 
March 1 passed and I still hadn’t begun drafting the 
article, though I now had a decent idea of what I planned to say 
and I understood the details about the financial crisis and the 
flash crash reasonably well. I was scheduled to give a talk to 
my law school’s board of visitors on March 4th, so I decided to 
discuss the timing of the Pomerantz lecture and how I hadn’t 
yet started writing the article in the context of a larger book 
project on the role of delay in decision making (which I had also 
barely started, and which was due in a few months). Later that 
day, Elizabeth Alper sent me a reminder e-mail that the 
lecture would be on March 15. Then, I shifted gears and 
worked furiously for a week. On March 10, I circulated a draft 
of the talk, which I continued to edit during the remaining 
days. Jim Fanto, Kent Greenfield, and Kristin Johnson were all 
gracious enough not to mention that I had given them only a 
few days to prepare a response to my draft (though, in my 
defense, they had a general idea of what I would cover well 
before that, and I believe they would not have begun preparing 
their comments until after March 10 in any event). 
Next, immediately after the talk, I met Shawna 
MacLeod, the Editor-in-Chief of this law review. A week later, 
as promised, she sent me a detailed note about timing, giving 
me the choice of sending a first round draft on May 27 or a 
final manuscript on July 15. I chose the latter. Then I promptly 
did nothing for a month. She sent a follow-up e-mail on June 
20, with eight apparently strict deadlines that would follow 
soon after I delivered the manuscript.  
After the Fourth of July weekend, I finally went through 
all the materials my research assistants had gathered, and I 
spent the next eleven days finishing the research and writing 
of the article. The editorial process then went smoothly, and we 
approved the final manuscript on November 11. 
I include all of this detail for two reasons. First, I know 
from discussions with many other academics that my various 
delays, though they might seem like irresponsible 
procrastination to people with real-world jobs, actually are 
consistent with a common and reasonable approach to 
scholarly writing. If I had written this article right away, I 
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would have missed many important details, thoughts, and 
research. I would not have had the opportunity to let the ideas 
brew for several months before putting them down on paper. 
Waiting until the last minute isn’t always bad; it is often 
precisely what we should be doing: taking as long as we 
possibly can to consider a research project and then finishing at 
the last possible moment at the highest possible speed. 
Second, I want to set forth the details of this account to 
remind academics that, although the Internet and the 
temptations of publishing in speedier venues are attractive 
alternatives to the slower pace of traditional academic articles 
and books, there are benefits to longer-form, longer-term 
writing that these other media do not have. The academics’ 
comparative advantage is to take more time, to think through 
complex issues more deeply than others. Given the increasing 
speed of other approaches to writing, more leisurely-paced 
scholarship in academic articles and books is increasingly 
important today. That isn’t to say that academics should avoid 
writing for other media, but rather that there is a special place 
for delayed thinking. 
If the snooty lawyer confronting Abe Pomerantz in the 
story at the beginning of this article had taken more time to 
think, he would not have insulted Abe—he would have thanked 
him for suing his clients. Many lawyers, plaintiff- and defense-
side alike, make judgments about the other side based on limited 
information. We all are prone to biases and cognitive error. But a 
fairer, more experienced counsel would have understood that 
securities litigation can and often does serve an important social 
purpose—deterring the fraudulent conduct that threatens 
investors and markets. Or at least he would have understood 
that without plaintiffs’ lawyers he would not have a job. 
If we learn no other lesson from the recent financial 
crisis and the flash crash, hopefully lawyers and regulators—
and academics—will understand that there are dangers 
associated with snap decisions, and that we should include 
timing and delay among the factors that matter in regulating 
financial markets. 
